According to Egyptian and Palestinian Authority sources, the ceasefire agreement that came last month between Israel and Hamas contains the exact same language as the agreement that Hamas rejected, but that Israel agreed to six weeks earlier.

Palestinian man kisses a Hamas sniper at rally (albawaba.com, AFP)

Not only that, but the indefinite agreement revolves around principles nearly identical to those of the ceasefire that ended the 2012 conflict between Israel and Hamas. That was an eight-day conflict known within the Israeli Army as “Operation Pillar of Defense”. Leaving many to wonder in this two month-long war, what was Hamas trying to achieve?

It is well known that Hamas had stockpiled over 10,000 rockets and constructed dozens of underground tunnels in preparation for a full-scale war with Israel. These were meant to cause general terror amongst the Israeli population, similar to the June kidnapping of three teenagers by members of Hamas in the West Bank. But on July 14, with 170 Palestinians dead in a week of fighting and with Israel warning of a ground invasion, why did Hamas choose to carry on? Did Hamas not know that more innocent Gazans would come in the way of the fighting? Were they more committed to causing terror amongst the Israeli people than making diplomatic strides for Gaza?

Hamas’ claim was at that moment, a ceasefire would be “an initiative of kneeling and submission“. Six weeks later, when Hamas ultimately agreed to the indefinite ceasefire, over 2000 Palestinian lives had been lost (1000 of whom were Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives). What changed during the next six weeks that motivated Hamas to agree to a truce? Potentially, the deaths of three high-ranking Hamas figures. The destruction of nearly all their underground tunnels and at least 70% of their missiles. The fear amongst Hamas’ top leaders that maybe the Israeli Army would target them next.

Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas who resides in Qatar, stalled ceasefire negotiations and according to al-monitor.com, “refused to listen to the movement’s leaders in Gaza who felt that each additional day of combat meant another day of destruction in the Gaza Strip”. As soon as a ceasefire was agreed to, Hamas held a rally in Gaza claiming victory for the destruction that it had done to Israel and hailing those Gazans who died as martyrs. Haniyeh also made false promises that as a result of the war, without any diplomatic negotiation, Gaza would soon enjoy its own seaport and airport. Unfortunately, for Hamas and for Gaza, Hamas’ conflict was nothing but a false promise. Hamas’ goals back on July 14 only led to the deterioration of their own people’s livelihood.